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Creating an Environment: Developing Venture Capital in India
Rafiq Dossani and Martin Kenney
In  the  last  decade,  one  of  the  most  admired  institutions  among  industrialists  and
economic policymakers around the world has been the U.S. venture capital industry. A
recent OECD (2000) report identified venture capital as a critical component for the success
of entrepreneurial high-technology firms and recommended that all nations consider strate-
gies for encouraging the availability of venture capital. With such admiration and encourage-
ment from prestigious international organizations has come various attempts to create an
indigenous venture capital industry. This article examines the efforts to create a venture
capital industry in India.
The possibility and ease of cross-national transference of institutions has been a subject
of  debate  among  scholars,  policymakers,  and  industrialists  during  the  entire  twentieth
century, if not earlier (e.g., Kogut 1998). National economies have particular path-depen-
dent trajectories, as do their national systems of innovation (NIS).1 The forces arrayed
against transfer are numerous and include cultural factors, legal systems, entrenched institu-
tions, and even lack of adequately trained personnel. Failure to transfer is probably the most
frequent  outcome,  as  institutional  inertia  is  usually  the  default  option.  In  the  transfer
process, there is a matrix of possible interactions between the transferred institution and the
environment.  There  are  four  possible  outcomes:  A)  The  institution  can  be  successfully
transferred with no significant changes to either the institution or the environment. B)
The institutional transfer can fail. C) The institution can be modified or hybridized so
that it is able to integrate into the new environment. D) The institution can modify the
new environment. Though A and B are exclusionary, it is possible for transfer to yield a
combination of C and D.2
The establishment of any institution in another environment can be a difficult trial-and-
error learning process. Even in the United States, state and local government policies to
encourage venture capital formation have been largely unsuccessful, i.e., outcome B (Florida
and Smith 1993). Similarly, efforts in the 1980s by a number of European governments to8
create national venture capital industries also failed. Probably the only other nation to
develop a fully Silicon Valley-style venture capital industry is Israel. Taiwan, perhaps, is the
only other country that appears to have developed a venture capital industry, though there
has  been  little  research  on  the  dynamics  of  this  process  in  Taiwan.  Given  the  general
difficulties in more wealthy and developed nations, it would seem that India would have
poor prospects for developing a viable venture capital community.
India is a significant case study for a number of reasons. First, in contrast to the United
States, India had a history of state-directed institutional development that is similar, in
certain ways, to such development in Japan and Korea, with the exception that ideologically
the Indian government was avowedly hostile to capitalism. Furthermore, the government’s
powerful bureaucracy tightly controlled the economy, and the bureaucracy had a reputation
for corruption. Such an environment would be considered hostile to the development of an
institution dependent upon a stable, transparent institutional environment. India did have a
number of strengths. It had an enormous number of small businesses and a public equity
market. Wages were low, not only for physical labor, but also for trained engineers and
scientists, of which there was a surfeit. India also boasted a homegrown software industry
that  began  in  the  1980s,  and  became  visible  upon  the  world  scene  in  the  mid-1990s.
Experiencing rapid growth, some Indian software firms became significant successes and
were able to list on the U.S. NASDAQ. Finally, beginning in the 1980s, but especially in the
1990s,  a  number  of  Indian  engineers  who  had  emigrated  to  the  United  States  became
entrepreneurs and began their own high-technology firms. They were extremely successful,
making them multimillionaires or even billionaires, and some of them then became venture
capitalists or angel investors. So there was a group of potential transfer agents.
For any transfer process, there has to be some match between the environment and the
institution. Also, there must be agents who will mobilize resources to facilitate the process,
though these agents can be in the public or private sector. Prior to 1985, the development of
venture capital in India was very unlikely. However, the environment began to change after
1985, and continues to change. Even in the United States, venture capital is only a small
component of the much larger national system of innovation (NIS), and as such is dependent
on many other institutions. In the United States and in India the development of venture
capital has been a co-evolutionary process. This is particularly true in India, where it remains
a small industry precariously dependent upon other institutions, particularly the govern-
ment, and external actors such as international lending agencies, overseas investors, and
successful Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. The growth of Indian venture capital must
be examined within the context of the larger political and economic system in India. As was
true in other countries, the Indian venture capital industry is the result of an iterative
learning process, and it is still in its infancy. If it is to be successful it will be necessary not
only for it to grow, but also for its institutional context to evolve.
The paper begins with a brief description of the development of U.S. and Israeli venture
capital industries. Particular attention is given to the role of the state. The second and third
sections discuss the Indian economic and financial environment that forms the backdrop to
the formation of the venture capital industry. This is followed by a brief overview of the
Indian information technology (IT) industry and a section on the role of nonresident Indians
(NRIs). These sections set the stage for understanding the development of venture capital in
India. The actual development of the Indian venture capital is set forth chronologically. The
first period is when government and multilateral lending agencies are the primary actors and
investors  in  the  Indian  venture  capital  industry.  The  second  period  is  the  result  of  an9
increasing liberalization of the venture capital market and the entrance of more private
venture capitalists particularly from the United States. The final sections reflect upon the
progress of the Indian venture capital industry, while also highlighting the institutional
barriers to continuing expansion.
1. Venture Capital as an Institution
Prior to World War II, the source of risk capital for entrepreneurs everywhere was either the
government, government-sponsored institutions meant to invest in such ventures, or infor-
mal investors that usually had some prior linkage to the entrepreneur. In general, private
banks have been unwilling to lend money for a newly established firm, because of the high
risk and lack of collateral. In the United States after World War II, a set of intermediaries, the
venture capitalists, emerged whose sole activity was investing in fledgling firms. From its
earliest beginnings, venture capital gradually expanded and became increasingly formalized.
Also, the locus of the venture capital industry shifted from the East Coast to the West Coast
(Florida and Kenney1998a; 1998b). By the mid-1980s, the ideal–typical venture capital firm
was based in Silicon Valley and invested largely in the electronics sector, with lesser sums
devoted to medical technology.3
After an evolutionary learning process, the ideal–typical institutional form for venture
capital became the venture capital firm operating a series of funds raised from wealthy
individuals, pension funds, foundations, endowments, and various other institutional sources.
The venture capitalists were professionals, often with industry experience, and the investors
were silent limited partners. At present a fund generally operates for a set number of years
(usually between seven and ten) and then is terminated. Normally, each firm manages more
than one partnership simultaneously. Even though the venture capital firm is the quintessen-
tial organizational format, there are other vehicles, the most persistent of which have been
venture capital subsidiaries of major corporations, financial and nonfinancial.
The venture capitalist invests in a recently established firm believed to have the potential
to provide a return of ten times or more in less than five years. This is highly risky, and many
of the investments fail entirely; however, the large winners are expected to more than
compensate for the failures. In return for investing, the venture capitalists not only receive a
major equity stake in the firm, but they also demand seats on the board of directors. By
active intervention and assistance, venture capitalists act to increase the chances of survival
and rate of growth of the new firm. Their involvement extends to several functions, such as
helping to recruit key personnel and providing strategic advice and introductions to poten-
tial customers, strategic partners, later-stage financiers, investment bankers, and various
other contacts. The venture capitalist therefore provides more than just money, and this is a
crucial difference between venture capital and other types of funding. The venture capital
industry has, more recently, specialized even by stages of growth: there are early or seed
funds, mature-stage funds, and bridge funds.
The venture capital process is complete when the company is sold through either a listing
on the stock market or the acquisition of the firm by another firm, or when the company
fails. For this reason, the venture capitalist is a temporary investor and usually a member of
the firm’s board of directors only until their investment is liquidated. The firm is a product to
be sold, not retained (Kenney and von Burg 1999). The venture capital process requires that10
investments be liquidated, so there must be the possibility of exiting the firm. Nations that
erect impediments to any of the exit paths (including bankruptcy) are choosing to handicap
the development of the institution of venture capital. This is not to say that such nations will
be unable to foster entrepreneurship, only that it is unlikely that venture capital as an
institution will thrive.
There has been much debate about the preconditions for venture capital. One obvious
conclusion is that entrepreneurship is the precondition for venture capital, not vice versa;
however, this is a misleading statement in a number of dimensions. At some level, entrepre-
neurship occurs in nearly every society, but venture capital can only exist when there is a
constant flow of opportunities that have enormous upside potential. Information technology
has been the only business field that has offered such a long history of opportunities. So
entrepreneurship is a precondition, but not any type of entrepreneurship will do. Moreover,
venture investing can encourage and increase the “proper” type of entrepreneurship, i.e.,
successful venture capitalists can positively affect their environment.
In the United States, the government has played a role in the development of venture
capital, though for the most part it was indirect. This indirect role, i.e., the general policies
that benefited the development of the venture capital industry, was probably the most
significant. To list some of the most important, the U.S. government generally followed
sound monetary and fiscal policies ensuring relatively low inflation; as a result, the financial
environment and currency were stable. U.S. tax policy, though it changed repeatedly, has
been favorable to capital gains, and several decreases in capital gains taxes may have had
some positive effect on the availability of venture capital (Gompers 1994). The stock market,
which has been the exit strategy of choice for venture capitalists, has been strictly regulated
and  characterized  by  increasing  openness.  This  has  created  a  general  macroeconomic
environment of financial stability and openness for investors, thereby reducing the external
risks of investing in high-risk firms. Put differently, an extra set of environmental risks
stemming from government action was minimized—a sharp contrast to most developing
nations during the last fifty years.
Another important policy has been a willingness to invest heavily in university-based
research. This investment has funded generations of graduate students in the sciences and
engineering, and from this research have come trained personnel and innovations, some of
which have resulted in the formation of firms that have been funded by venture capitalists.
U.S. universities, such as MIT, Stanford, and the University of California, Berkeley, played a
particularly salient role (Kenney and von Burg 1999; Saxenian 1994).
The most important direct U.S. government involvement in encouraging the growth of
venture capital was the passage of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, authorizing
the formation of small business investment corporations (SBICs). The legislation was not
aimed at encouraging venture capital per se. It meant to create a vehicle for funding small
firms of all types. The legislation was complicated, but for the development of venture
capital the following features were most significant: It permitted individuals to form SBICs
with private funds as paid-in capital and then they could borrow money on a two-to-one
ratio initially up to $300,000,4 i.e., they could use up to $300,000 of SBA-guaranteed money
for their investment of $150,000 in private capital. There were also tax and other
benefits, such as income and a capital gains pass-through and the allowance of a carried
interest for the investors.
The SBIC program also provided a vehicle for banks to circumvent the Depression-era
laws prohibiting commercial banks from owning more than 5 percent of any industrial firm.11
The banks’ SBIC subsidiaries allowed them to acquire equity in small firms. This made even
more capital available to fledgling firms, and was a significant source of capital in the 1960s
and  1970s.  The  final  investment  format  permitted  SBICs  to  raise  money  in  the  public
market. For the most part, these public SBICs failed and/or were liquidated by the mid-
1970s. After the mid-1970s, with the exception of the bank SBICs, the program was no
longer important to the venture capital industry.
The SBIC program experienced serious problems almost immediately. Starting in 1965,
Federal criminal prosecution was necessary to rectify SBIC corruption. By one estimate,
“nine  out  of  ten  SBICs  had  violated  agency  regulations  and  dozens  of  companies  had
committed criminal acts” (Bean 2000). Despite the corruption, something valuable also
occurred. Particularly in Silicon Valley, several individuals used their SBICs to leverage their
personal capital, and they were so successful that they were able to reimburse the program
and raise institutional money to become formal venture capitalists. The SBIC program
accelerated their capital accumulation, and as important, government regulations made
these new venture capitalists professionalize their investment activity, which had been
informal  prior  to  entering  the  program.  Now-illustrious  firms  such  as  Sutter  Hill
Ventures, Institutional Venture Partners, Bank of America Ventures, and Menlo Ven-
tures began as SBICs.
The historical record also indicates that government action can harm venture capital.
The most salient example came in 1973 when the U.S. Congress, in response to widespread
corruption in pension funds, changed federal pension fund regulations. In their haste to
prohibit abuses, Congress passed the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
making pension fund managers criminally liable for losses incurred in high-risk investments.
This was interpreted to include venture capital funds. The result was that pension managers
shunned venture capital, nearly destroying the entire industry. This was only reversed after
active lobbying by the newly created National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) in 1973
(Pincus 2000; Stultz 2000). Only in 1977 did they succeed in starting a process of a gradual
loosening that was completed in 1982 (Kenney forthcoming). The reinterpretation of these
pension fund guidelines contributed to a flood of new money into venture capital funds.
The most successful case of the export of Silicon Valley-style venture capital practice is
Israel, where the government played an important role in encouraging the growth of venture
capital (Autler 2000). The government has a relatively good economic record; there is a
minimum of corruption; there is massive investment in military and, particularly, electronics
research; and the higher educational system is excellent. The interaction between Israelis and
Jewish individuals in the United States in the creation of the Israeli venture capital system
should not be underestimated. For example, the well-known U.S. venture capitalist, Fred
Adler,  began  investing  in  Israeli  startups  in  the  early  1970s.  In  1985,  Fred  Adler  was
involved in forming the first true Israeli venture capital fund (Autler 2000: 40). Still, the
creation  of  the  venture  capital  industry  would  wait  until  the  1990s,  when  the  Israeli
government created a government-funded organization, Yozma, meant to encourage venture
capital in Israel. Yozma received $100 million from the Israeli government. It invested $8
million in ten funds that were required to raise another $12 million each from “a significant
foreign partner,” presumably an overseas venture capital firm (Autler 2000: 44). Yozma also
retained $20 million to invest itself. These “sibling” funds were the backbone of an industry
that  grew  to  the  point  where  in  1999  in  excess  of  $1  billion  was  invested  in  Israel
(Pricewaterhouse 2000). So, initially venture capital investing in Israel was entirely under-
taken by the private sector (though often the investments were in spin-offs of public research.12
However, the government Yozma program created a hybrid of private investment with
government support, which supercharged the growth of venture capital. The critical point is
that private venture capital existed before government involvement, as was true for the U.S.
SBIC program. Moreover, in the late 1990s government support has become much less
important. In other words, government support did not create the industry, but had an effect
on its growth.
Prior to the 1970s, venture capital was only a small, though growing, aspect of the U.S.
NIS. As an institution, venture capital emerged through an organic trial-and-error process,
before  maturing  into  today’s  powerful  institution  for  the  encouragement  of  new  firm
formation. In the U.S. case, the role of the government was limited and contradictory. In
Israel, the government was able to play a significant role, because there were supportive
environmental  conditions,  and  private-sector  venture  capital  had  already  emerged.  To
conclude, the government can play a role in encouraging venture capital. In some countries,
this can include loosening regulatory constraints and facilitating the development of venture
capital.  Whereas  in  the  United  States  the  most  important  role  of  the  government  was
indirect, and in Israel it was largely positive in assisting the growth of venture capital, in
India the role of the government would have to be more active in removing barriers. In the
next sections, we turn to an examination of the Indian venture capital industry.
2. General Indian Economic and Financial Environment
From its inception, the Indian venture capital industry has been affected by international and
domestic developments; its current situation is the result of the evolution of what initially
appeared to be unrelated historical trajectories. To create a venture capital industry in India
through transplantation required the existence of a minimal set of supportive conditions.
They need not necessarily be optimal, because, if the industry survived, it would likely set in
motion a positive feedback process that would foster the emergence of successful new firms,
encourage investment of more venture capital, and support the growth of other types of
expertise associated with the venture capital industry; in other words, if the venture capital
industry experienced any success it could entrain a process of shaping its environment.
Small and medium-sized enterprises have a long history and great importance to India.
The  leaders  of  the  Independence  movement  were  supporters  of  small  businesses  as  an
alternative to “exploitation” by multinational firms. And yet, despite the emphasis upon and
celebration of small enterprises, the Indian economy was dualistic. It was dominated by a
few massive private-sector conglomerates, such as the Tata and Birla groups, and various
nationalized firms, even though there was an enormous mass of small shopkeepers and local
industrial firms. As anywhere else, these small firms were in traditional industries and were
not relevant for the emergence of venture capital, but they do indicate a culture of private
enterprise. This entrepreneurial propensity also has been demonstrated by the willingness of
Indians in other countries to establish industries, shops, restaurants, and hotels.
Already, right up to British rule, Indians valued education very highly. After Indepen-
dence, the Indian government invested heavily in education, and Indian universities attracted
excellent students. In the 1960s, the Ford Foundation worked with the Indian government to
establish the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT), which adopted MIT’s undergraduate
curriculum. These institutions very quickly became the elite Indian engineering schools with13
extremely competitive entrance examinations and to which only the most intelligent students
could gain entry. The excellent Indian students were very desired by overseas university
graduate programs generally, and in engineering particularly. After graduating from over-
seas programs many of these Indian students did not return to India. However, many other
Indian graduates remained in India working in the large family conglomerates, the many
Indian universities, and various top-level research institutes such as those for space research
(Baskaran 2000). This meant that there was a significant pool of excellent engineers and
scientists who were underpaid (by global standards), and potentially mobile.
Despite these strengths, India had many cultural rigidities and barriers to entrepreneur-
ship and change, beginning with an extremely intrusive bureaucracy and extensive regula-
tions. Until recently the labor market was quite rigid. For well-educated Indians the ideal
career path was to enter the government bureaucracy, a lifetime position; enter the family
business, which was then a lifetime position; or join one of the large conglomerates such as
Tata and Birla, which also effectively guaranteed lifetime employment. The final career path
was to emigrate; not surprisingly, among the immigrants were many seeking better opportu-
nities  and  release  from  the  rigidities  at  home.  In  summation,  the  institutional  context
discouraged investment and entrepreneurship. The next sections examine the features of the
Indian  economy  that  would  evolve  to  make  the  creation  of  the  Indian  venture  capital
industry possible.
3. The Indian Financial System
India has a large, sophisticated financial system including private and public, formal and
informal actors. In addition to formal financial institutions, informal institutions such as
family and moneylenders are important sources of capital. India has substantial capital
resources, but as the table below, on the disposition of Indian capital resources, indicates, the
bulk of this capital resides in the banking system. In the formal financial system, lending is
dominated by retail banks rather than the wholesale banks or the capital markets for debt.
The primary method for firms to raise capital is through the equity markets, rather than
private financial intermediaries.
3.1 The Banking System
Prior to independence from Britain, the banking system was entirely private and largely
family-operated. In the pre-war period, the family-run banks often invested in new ventures.
After Independence, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the State Bank of India were
nationalized, with the State Bank of India continuing to play the role of banker to govern-
ment agencies and companies. Then, in 1969, the next fourteen largest banks were national-
ized. Together with the State Bank of India, the state then controlled 90 percent of all bank
assets. The nationalized banking system became an instrument of social policy. Between
1969 and 1991, the financial position of the banks progressively weakened, due to loss-
making branch expansions, ever-strengthening unions, overstaffing, and politicized loans.
Until 1991, depositors were reluctant to use banks because, although their savings were safe,
the government set deposit interest rates below the rate of inflation. By 1991, the entire bank
system was unprofitable and close to collapse.514
The socialized banking system had other perverse effects. For example, although the
bank managers were civil servants and very risk-averse, they could offer below-market
interest  rates.  This  created  excessive  demand  for  funds,  but,  quite  naturally,  bankers
extended the loans to their safest customers. These were primarily the large firms owned by
the government, which operated the largest steel, coal, electrical, and other manufacturing
industries. The other large bank borrowers were the giant family conglomerates such as the
Tata and Birla group. This increased the group’s economic power, but did not lead to
economically efficient decisions about how to deploy capital.6 Small firms were starved for
capital. Thus the Indian banks provided no resources for entrepreneurial firms.
3.2 Equity
The first Indian stock markets were established during the British Raj in the nineteenth
century. During the early part of the twentieth century, Indian equity markets actively
financed not only banking, but also the cotton and jute trades (Schrader 1997). In 1989 there
were fourteen stock markets in India, though Bombay was by far the largest (World Bank
1989). The socialization of the economy, and particularly banking, after independence
reinforced the strength of the stock markets as a source of capital, and by the 1960s, India
had one of the most sophisticated stock markets in any developing country.
There were several reasons for the growth of the Indian stock market. Motivated by its
egalitarian principles, the government supported the stock markets as an instrument for
reducing the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few industrialists (an outcome of
the government policy of providing below-market interest loans). Second, the government
industrial licensing policy instituted in 1961 meant that businesses had to apply for govern-
ment permission to establish new ventures. Permissions were given only in the context of the
The Disposition of Indian Capital Resources and Their Availability for Venture
Investing in 1996–97
Billion
Rupees
Percent of Total Percent Permitted for Venture
Capital Investment
Currency and Bank
Deposits 634.90 50.1
Up to 5 percent of new funds,
since April 1999
Government Securities
116.36 9.2 None
Life Insurance Funds
156.36
12.3
None
Pension Funds 262.48 20.7 None
Privately held Shares
and Debentures
(including through
mutual funds)
96.34 7.6 Some
TOTAL 1266.44 100
Source: Statistical Outline of India, 1998-99, pub. By Tata Services Ltd.15
Soviet-style national plans for each sector. There was a strong element of favoritism in who
received permission. Most important, due to government central planning controls, short-
ages were endemic. A permission to produce was a guarantee of profits.
The distortion these policies created by encouraging concentration were meant to be
offset by RBI stipulation that private-sector borrowers could not own more than 40 percent
of the firm’s equity if they wished to receive bank finance. So, to raise money the private
sector became reliant on stock markets. Investors, large and small, readily financed ventures
since the shortages induced by the planning system guaranteed a ready market for anything
produced. Curiously, the retention of 40 percent of the equity by the core investors meant
that in reality they controlled the firm.
The stock market also benefited when in 1973 the government required all foreign firms
to decrease ownership in their Indian subsidiaries to 40 percent. Faced with a choice between
selling stakes privately and listing on the stock exchanges, most firms chose the latter and
issued new stock, which led to a large increase in public ownership of such companies. The
40-percent regulation did not liberalize firms as much as one might expect. Because loans
were also necessary for firms and this required collateral in fixed assets, new entrepreneurs
were restricted to sectors with asset-heavy projects. This disadvantaged the service sector,
resulting in even greater concentration, and the equity markets focused on financing low-risk
projects. Finally, the public’s enthusiasm for firms operating within a licensed industry
meant that it was difficult for other new firms to secure capital through listing on the stock
exchanges.
In 1991, as part of a large number of financial reforms, the Securities and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI) was created to regulate the stock market. At the time, there were 6,229
companies listed on all the stock exchanges in India (RBI 1999). The reforms and loosening
of regulations resulted in an increase in the number of listed companies to 9,877 by March
1999, and daily turnover on the stock exchanges rose to 107.5 billion rupees (US $2.46
billion) by December 1999. One reform was the removal of a profitability criterion as a
requirement of listing. To replace the profitability requirement, it was stipulated that a firm
would be de-listed if it did not earn profits within three years of listing. This reform meant
unprofitable firms could be listed, providing an exit mechanism for investors. Not surpris-
ingly, there was a dramatic increase in the listings of high-technology firms.
In  terms  of  experience,  India  contrasted  favorably  with  most  developing  countries,
which had small, inefficient stock markets listing only established firms. Even in Europe,
until the creation of new stock markets in the mid-1990s, it was extremely difficult to list
small high-technology firms (Posner 2000). However, although these stock markets pro-
vided an exit opportunity, they did not provide the capital for firm establishment. Put
differently, accessible stock markets did not create venture capital for startups; they merely
provided an opportunity for raising follow-on capital or an exit opportunity.
3.3 Other Institutional Sources of Funds
India has a strong mutual fund sector that began in 1964 with the formation of the Unit
Trust of India (UTI), an open-ended mutual fund, promoted by a group of public sector
financial institutions. Because UTI’s investment portfolio was to consist of longer-term
loans, it was meant to offer savers a return superior to bank rates. In keeping with the risk-
averse Indian environment, initially UTI invested primarily in long-term corporate debt.
However, UTI eventually became the country’s largest public equity owner as well. This was16
because the government controlled interest rates in order to reduce the borrowing costs of
the large manufacturing firms that it owned. These rates were usually set well below market
rates, yet UTI and other institutional lenders were forced to lend at these rates. In response,
firms  started  issuing  debt  that  was  partially  convertible  into  equity  in  order  to  attract
institutional funds. By 1985, the conversion of these securities led to UTI becoming the
largest owner of publicly listed equity (UTI Annual Report, 1985). By 1991, the equity
portion of the UTI portfolio had grown to 30 percent (UTI Annual Report, 1991). In 1992,
in tandem with banking sector reform, permission to form privately owned mutual funds
(including foreign-owned funds) was granted, leading to a gradual erosion in UTI’s then-
dominant market share.
Until April 1999, mutual funds were not allowed to invest in venture capital companies.
Since then, the mutual funds have been allowed to commit up to 5 percent of their funds as
venture capital, either through direct investments or through investment in venture capital
firms.  However,  the  mutual  funds  have  not  yet  overcome  their  risk-averse  nature  and
invested in venture capital, either directly or indirectly through investment in venture capital
funds. Certainly, should the mutual funds decide to invest directly in firms, there would be
operational issues regarding the capability of mutual funds to perform the venture capital
function.
The largest single source of funds for U.S. venture capital funds since the 1980s has been
public- and private-sector pension funds. In India, there are large pension funds but they are
prohibited from investing in either equity or venture capital vehicles. This means they cannot
be a source of capital.
In summation, prior to the late 1980s, though India did have a vibrant stock market, the
rigid and numerous regulations made it nearly impossible for the existing financial institu-
tions to invest in venture capital firms or to undertake the role of investing in startups.
Nearly all of these institutions were politicized, and the government bureaucrats operating
them  were  risk-averse.  On  the  positive  side,  there  was  a  stock  market  with  investors
amenable to purchasing the equity in fairly early-stage companies. It was also possible to
bootstrap a firm and/or secure funds from friends and family—if one was well connected.
However, no financial intermediaries comfortable with backing small technology-based
firms existed prior to the late 1980s. It is safe to say that little capital was available for any
entrepreneurial initiatives. Any entrepreneur aiming to create a firm would have to draw
upon familial capital or bootstrap their firm.
4. The Indian Information Technology Industry
A viable venture capital industry depends upon a continuing flow of investment opportuni-
ties capable of growing sufficiently rapidly to the point at which they can be sold yielding a
significant annual return on investment. If such opportunities do not exist, then the emer-
gence of venture capital is unlikely. Quite simply, in the United States and Israel such
opportunities occurred most regularly in the information technologies. Moreover, in every
country, with the possible exception of the United States, any new serious opportunity
would have to be oriented toward the global market, because few national markets are
sufficiently large to generate the necessary capital gains.17
Since Independence, the Indian government had aimed for autarky, and the protection of
Indian markets and firms from multinational competition guided nearly every policy—the
information technology industries were no exceptions. In the mid-1970s, the Indian govern-
ment demanded that IBM reduce the percentage ownership of its Indian operations to 40
percent, but IBM refused and left India in 1978. After this the government gave the state-run
Computer Maintenance Corporation “a legal monopoly to service all foreign systems”
(Brunner 1995 quoted in Lateef 1997). IBM’s retreat released 1,200 software personnel into
the Indian market, and some of these established small software houses (Lateef 1997). The
protectionist policy had benefits and costs. The benefit was that it contributed to the creation
of an Indian IT industry; the cost was that the industry was backward despite the excellence
of its personnel. After IBM’s withdrawal, there was little further interest by multinational
firms in the Indian market. Due to this lack of foreign investment and despite the presence of
skilled Indian personnel, India was a technological backwater even while East Asia pro-
gressed rapidly.
In 1984, in response to the failure of the government-run computer firms and the success
of private firms such as Wipro, HCL, and Tata Consultancy Services, the Indian government
began to liberalize the computer and software industry by encouraging exports (Evans
1992). This was particularly timely because there was a worldwide shortage of software
programmers. In 1986 Texas Instruments received government permission to establish a
100-percent  foreign-owned  software  subsidiary  in  India.  The  excellence  of  the  Indian
personnel,  which  was  due,  in  large  measure,  to  a  wise  decision  in  the  1960s  by  the
government to increase its investments in education, soon attracted other foreign software
engineering operations to India. Contemporaneously, entrepreneurs exploited the labor cost
differential to “body-shop” Indian programmers overseas. By 1989, this accounted for over
90 percent of software revenues (Schware 1992 cited in Lateef 1997). The body-shopping
and the foreign-owned engineering operations provided a conduit through which Indian
engineers could learn about the cutting-edge software techniques and developments in the
West and particularly Silicon Valley. These activities created a network of contacts and an
awareness of the state-of-the-art in global computing and software technology. The center of
this activity was the South Indian city of Bangalore (Mitta 1999).
By the early 1990s, Indian firms also began the development of a market for off-site
contract programming. This market grew impressively in the 1990s, as shown in the figure
below. Moreover, the percentage of on-site contract programming revenues fell from 90
percent in 1988 to 45 percent in 1999–2000 (Nasscom 1998). Still, because an additional 35
percent of work is off-site contract programming, low value-added services remain domi-
nant. High value-added “next-stage” businesses, including turnkey projects, consultancy
and transformational outsourcing make up the balance, and branded product development
for the export market is negligible. A few of these firms, particularly Infosys and Wipro,
grew to be quite large both in terms of manpower and revenue. They were successful on the
Indian stock market in the 1990s, and in the late 1990s they listed their stock on the U.S.
NASDAQ. Interestingly, in contrast to Taiwan, Korea, and, increasingly, China, the Indian
hardware sector remains negligible, although there have been a few notable recent successes,
such as Armedia and Ramp Networks.18
One small conglomerate, Wipro, established an IT spin-off business in Bangalore in
1980, and grew to become the most highly valued Indian IT company. Another leading
Indian firm, Infosys, was founded 1981 and listed on the U.S. NASDAQ. In August 2000 its
valuation reached nearly $17 billion. These and other successes demonstrated that firms
capable of rapidly increasing in value could be formed in India. This is despite the fact, as
Arora and Arunachalam (2000) note, that the development of globally distributed packaged
software programs, which is the source of the greatest profits, has not occurred. Indian
software firms have an assured market for their contract programming work and, therefore,
little incentive to take the risk of developing software packages (Naqvi 1999). Finally, the
largest firms, perhaps due to their visibility in overseas markets through their branch offices,
have leveraged their manpower resources to better advantage than small firms have, leading
to an erosion in the share of small firms (Naqvi, 1999).
By the early 1990s, India had an information technology industry that centered on
software and drew upon the legions of relatively skilled Indian engineers.7 The Indian IT
industry was growing quickly, and newly formed firms had entered the industry; however,
the opportunities had not yet led to the creation of any information technology-oriented
venture capitalists. Also, at the time there were not yet any knowledgeable information
technology industry veterans in India who also had experienced the startup and venture
capital  process  first  hand.  However,  in  Silicon  Valley  an  entire  cadre  of  Indians  was
emerging who had such experiences.
Statistics—IT Industry in India
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99
US$ m US$ m US$ m US$ m US$ m
Software
Domestic 350 490 670 950 1,250
Exports 485 734 1,083 1,750 2,650
Total 835 1,224 1,753 2,700 3,900
Hardware
Domestic 590 1,037 1,050 1,205 1,026
Exports 177 35 286 201 4
Total 767 1,072 1,336 1,406 1,030
Peripherals
Domestic 148 196 181 229 329
Exports 6 6 14 19 18
Total 154 202 195 248 347
Other
Training 107 145 183 263 302
Maintenance 142 172 182 221 236
Networking and
others 36 710 156 193 237
Grand Total 2,041 2,886 3,805 5,031 6,052
Source: http://www.nasscom.org 200119
5. Nonresident Indians (NRIs)
From the 1950s onward, bright, well-educated Indian engineers attended U.S. universities
and remained to work in high-technology firms. In the 1960s and 1970s, this was considered
a “brain drain.” However, it seems likely that even if these engineers had returned to India,
there would have been few opportunities for them outside of government research organiza-
tions and the corporate research laboratories for firms such as Tata and Birla. For this and
other reasons, many Indians remained in the United States and secured employment in
universities and corporations, including Silicon Valley electronics firms.
Initially, these Indian engineers joined existing firms, but not surprisingly they were not
immune to the attractions of entrepreneurship, especially in Silicon Valley. The first note-
worthy group included Kanwal Rekhi, who co-founded Excelan, a data networking firm,
with three other Indian engineers in 1981. Excelan later was purchased by Novell, leaving
Rekhi and the other engineers with enormous capital gains. Another early entrepreneur was
Vinod Khosla, who in 1982 had co-founded Daisy Systems, and was a driving force in the
establishment of Sun Microsystems. After leaving Sun, he joined the prestigious venture
capital firm, Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield and Byers. Yet another Indian engineer, Yogen Dalal
(2000), co-founded Metaphor in 1982, Claris in 1987, and in 1991 joined the top-tier
venture capital fund, Mayfield Fund. Yet another successful early Indian entrepreneur was
Suhas Patil, who co-founded Cirrus Logic in 1984. These NRIs not only were successful
entrepreneurs, but they soon began investing in yet other startups.
Quite naturally, the NRIs remained in contact with family, friends, and classmates in
India. Moreover, by the late 1980s, the success of the NRIs came to the attention of Indian
policymakers. Even while concern about the brain drain continued, policymakers recognized
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  retain  such  highly  skilled  individuals  if  there  were  no
opportunities for them in India. NRIs wished to assist India: they visited India and discussed
their experiences in the United States, and expressed a willingness to invest in ventures their
friends and classmates might launch in India. However, they quickly discovered that it was
not so simple to transform their willingness to lend capital into the reality of a reasonable
investment. Gradually the NRIs were re-conceptualized from being “defectors” to being a
potential source of knowledge, connections, and even capital (Saxenian 2000).
From the perspective of creating venture capital, India had a stock market that with
minimal effort could handle public stock offerings from fledgling high-technology firms;
there was a growing IT industry with some firms that experienced extremely fast growth;
there was a cadre of Indians familiar with the operation of the U.S. Silicon Valley; and there
were sufficient skilled engineers in India to staff startups. In other words, by 1990 the environ-
mental preconditions for the successful establishment of a venture capital industry were in place.
In the next section, we examine the development of the Indian venture capital industry.
6. Venture Capital in India
In the early 1980s, the idea that venture capital might be established in India would have
seemed utopian. India’s highly bureaucratized economy, avowed pursuit of socialism, still
quite conservative social and business worlds, and a risk-averse financial system provided
little institutional space for the development of venture capital. With the high level of20
government involvement, it is not surprising that the first formal venture capital organiza-
tions began in the public sector. As in the case of Israel, from its inception the Indian venture
capital was linked with exogenous actors, public and private. In India, one of the most
autarchic economies in the world, both the development of venture capital and the informa-
tion technology industry have been intimately linked with the international economy.
The earliest discussion of venture capital in India came in 1973, when the government
appointed a commission to examine strategies for fostering small and medium-sized enter-
prises (Nasscom 2000). In 1983, a book that was written under the auspices of the Economic
and Scientific Research Foundation of India and entitled Risk Capital for Industry was
published in India. It showed how the Indian financial systems’ operation made it difficult to
raise  “risk  capital”  for  new  ventures  and  proposed  various  measures  to  liberalize  and
deregulate the financial market. Oddly, this book never mentioned venture capital per se
(Chitale 1983). Though this and other books did not have immediate results, they were an
indication of a political discussion of the difficulties India had in encouraging entrepreneur-
ship and the general malfunctioning of the Indian financial system. Venture capital would
become one small part of this larger discussion.
6.1 The First Stage, 1986–1995
Indian policy toward venture capital has to be seen in the larger picture of the government’s
interest in encouraging economic growth. This desire was frustrated by the government’s
bureaucratic control of the economy. The 1980s were marked by an increasing disillusion-
ment with the trajectory of the economic system and a belief that liberalization was needed.
The shift began under the government of Rajiv Gandhi, who had been elected in 1984. He
recognized the failure of the old policy of self-reliance and bureaucratic control. The policy
toward venture capital should be seen in this larger movement.
Prior to 1988, the Indian government had no policy toward venture capital; in fact, there
was no formal venture capital. In 1988, the Indian government issued its first guidelines to
legalize venture capital operations (Ministry of Finance 1988). These regulations really were
aimed at allowing state-controlled banks to establish venture capital subsidiaries, though it
was also possible for other investors to create a venture capital firm. However, there was
only minimal interest in the private sector in establishing a venture capital firm (Ramesh and
Gupta 1995).
The government’s awakening to the potential of venture capital occurred in conjunction
with  the  World  Bank’s  interest  in  encouraging  economic  liberalization  in  India.  So,  in
November 1988, the Indian government announced an institutional structure for venture
capital (Ministry of Finance 1988). This structure had received substantial input from the
World Bank, which had observed that the focus on lending rather than equity investment
had led to institutional finance that had become “increasingly inadequate for small and new
Indian companies focusing on growth” (World Bank 1989: 6). In addition, “the [capital]
markets have not been receptive to young growth companies needing new capital, making
them an unreliable source for growth capital” (World Bank 1989: 8). Though the exact
sequence of events is difficult to discover, some measure of the impetus for a more serious
consideration of venture capital came from the process that led to the 1989 World Bank
study quoted above. Noting that the government’s focus until then had been on direct
involvement in research and development (R&D) activities through its own research insti-
tutes, in technology selection on behalf of industry, and promoting of technological self-21
reliance within Indian industry, the 1989 World Bank report described approvingly a new
trend in government thinking toward shifting decision making with respect to technology
choice and R&D to industry (both private and public) and a more open attitude toward the
import of technology. The World Bank was keen to encourage this shift. The 1989 World
Bank (1989: 2) report noted that “Bank involvement…has already had an impact on the
plans and strategies of selected research and the standards, institutes and, with support from
the IFC, on the institutional structure of venture capital.”
Making the case for supporting the new venture capital guidelines with investments into
Indian venture capital funds (a first for the World Bank), the World Bank calculated that
demand over the next 2–3 years would be around $67–133 million per annum, and it
proposed providing $45 million to four public sector financial institutions for the purpose of
permitting them to establish venture capital operations under the November 1988 guidelines
issued by the Government of India. (One of these operations, TDICI, slightly predated the
guidelines, having been established in August 1988.)
The venture capital guidelines offered some liberalization, but not everything the World
Bank wished. The most important feature of the 1988 rules was that venture capital funds
received the benefit of a relatively low capital gains tax rate (but no pass-through), i.e., a rate
equivalent to the individual tax rate, which was lower than the corporate tax rate. They were
also allowed to exit investments at prices not subject to the control of the Ministry of
Finance’s Controller of Capital Issues (which otherwise did not permit exit at a premium
over par). The funds’ promoters had to be banks, large financial institutions, or private
investors. Private investors could own no more than 20 percent of the fund management
companies (although a public listing could be used to raise the needed funds).
The funds were restricted to investing in small amounts per firm (less than 100 million
rupees); the recipient firms had to be involved in technology that was “new, relatively
untried, very closely held or being taken from pilot to commercial stage, or which incorpo-
rated some significant improvement over the existing ones in India.” The government also
specified that the recipient firm’s founders should be “relatively new, professionally or
technically qualified, and with inadequate resources or backing to finance the project.”
There were also other bureaucratic fetters. There was even a list of approved investment
areas. Two government-sponsored development banks, ICICI and IDBI, were required to
clear every portfolio firm’s application to a venture capital firm to ensure that it fulfilled the
right purposes. Also, the Controller of Capital Issues of the Ministry of Finance had to
approve every line of business in which a venture capital firm wished to invest. In other
words, the venture capitalists were to be kept on a very short leash.
Despite these constraints, the World Bank supported the venture capital project, noting
that “the Guidelines reflect a cautious approach designed to maximize the likelihood of
venture capital financing for technology-innovation ventures during the initial period of
experimentation and thereby demonstrate the viability of venture capital in India. For this
reason, during the initial phase, the Guidelines focus on promoting venture capital under the
leadership of well-established financial institutions (World Bank 1989).” Interestingly, the
U.S. experience had shown that such highly constrained and bureaucratically controlled
venture capital operations were the least likely to succeed. Nonetheless, four state-owned
financial institutions established venture capital subsidiaries under these restrictive guide-
lines and received a total of $45 million from the World Bank.
The World Bank sought to ensure a level of professionalism in the four new venture
capital funds, two of which were established by two well-managed state-level financial22
institutions (Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat), one by a large nationalized bank (Canara Bank)
and one by a development financial institution (ICICI). The World Bank loaned the money
to the Indian government that would then on-lend it at commercial rates to these institutions
for sixteen years, including a seven-year moratorium on interest and principal repayments.
The venture capital funds were expected to be investing principally in equity or quasi-equity.
Some monies were allocated for training personnel through internship in overseas venture
capital funds.
This was an innovative project for the World Bank. The report noted (1989: 42) that
“this is the first experience of this kind in India or in the Bank.” To protect itself, the Bank
agreed to engage in “substantial supervision.” The World Bank would (1989: 31) “Review
and approve initially nearly 30 investments (made by the venture capitalists)…In addition,
during supervision missions, Bank staff would review and comment on additional projects
before  they  are  approved.”  Each  venture  capitalist  would  have  to  submit  semiannual
progress reports detailing (1989: 33) “prospects, risks, and reasons for choice of financial
instruments.” The venture capitalists agreed with the World Bank that they would operate
under the following operating guidelines: (a) the primary target groups for investment would
be private industrial firms with above-average value-added in sectors where India had a
comparative advantage, and protected industries would be avoided; (b) the quality and
experience of the management was key, along with the prospects of the product; (c) the
portfolio return should be targeted to be at least a 20 percent annual return; and (d) no single
firm should receive more than 10 percent of the funds, and the venture capitalist would not
own more than 49 percent of its voting stock. It is interesting that, in its spirit, the World
Bank’s funding was similar to that of the U.S. SBA’s funding of SBICs.8
In 1988, the first organization to actually identify itself as a venture capital operation,
Technology Development & Information Company of India Ltd. (TDICI), was established
in Bangalore as a subsidiary of the Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India, Ltd.
(ICICI), India’s second-largest development financial institution (at the time, it was state-
owned and managed). After considering venture capital investing in 1984, ICICI had begun
a small investing division at its Mumbai headquarters in 1985 focused upon unlisted, early-
stage companies (Nadkarni 2000; Pandey 1998). This division was run by Kiran Nadkarni,
who later went on to become TDICI’s second president. As an ICICI division, its venture
capital activities were circumscribed by the laws of the time. Learning from responses to
similar restrictions in Korea, Nadkarni (2000) and ICICI Chairman Vaghul implemented a
novel instrument for India, termed the “conditional loan.” It carried no interest but entitled
the lender to receive a royalty on sales (ICICI charged between 2 percent and 10 percent as a
royalty). They would typically invest 3 million rupees in a firm, of which one-third was used
to buy equity at par for about 20–40 percent of the firm, while the rest was invested as a
conditional loan, which “was repayable in the form of a royalty (on sales) after the venture
generated sales.” There was no interest on the loan. However, the problem with this scheme
is that the loan did not provide capital gains (Pandey 1998: 256).
In its first year, the division invested in seven such deals, of which three were in software
services, one in effluent engineering, and one in food products (a bubble gum manufacturer).
Being a novel institution in the Indian context, as Nadkarni (2000) noted, “There was no
obvious demand for this kind of funding and a lot of work went into creating such deals. Our
objective was not purely monetary but to support entrepreneurship. We searched for deals
that would earn us 2–3 percent above ICICI’s lending rate. It was initially just a one-person
operation [he] and then another person joined the team. Looking back, there was no sectoral23
focus, so it is remarkable that we invested so much in Information Technologies.” Their
primary task was identifying good firms and making sure they were properly financed.
However, they provided little input on setting corporate strategy, business development
ideas,  or  recruitment,  as  this  was  not  part  of  the  mandate.  There  were  some  missed
opportunities. For example, Infosys, then a fledgling startup, had approached ICICI, which
was managing PACT, a USAID project meant to fund cooperative research between U.S. and
Indian firms, for funding a medical diagnosis project. However, ICICI rejected Infosys’
request, because the project was deemed too risky.
In 1988, the ICICI division was merged into the newly formed TDICI in Bangalore,
which was an equal joint venture between ICICI and the state-run mutual fund UTI. The
primary reason for creating the joint venture with UTI was to use the tax pass-through, an
advantage that was not available to any corporate firm at that time other than UTI (which
had received this advantage through a special act of parliament). Hence, while the invest-
ment manager for the new funds was TDICI, it was a 50–50 partnership between ICICI and
UTI, and the funds were registered as UTI’s Venture Capital Unit Schemes (VECAUS).
Vecaus I, established in 1988, had a paid-in capital of 300 million rupees. Founded in 1991,
Vecaus II had a paid-in capital of 1 billion rupees.
Another reason for forming TDICI was that venture capital investments were too small
relative to ICICI’s own portfolio to be worth managing. Furthermore, it did not have the
flexibility or the ability to evaluate venture investments. For example, Praj Industries, an
effluent engineering firm funded by ICICI, used its funding to build a demonstration unit for
a  sugar  cooperative,  but  delays  in  project  implementation  led  to  a  delay  in  the  unit’s
completion until after the sugar harvesting season ended. This meant that the demonstration
unit would not receive raw material for another year. The ICICI investment committee was
not equipped to deal with such delays (Nadkarni 2000).
Rather than remaining in Bombay where ICICI was headquartered, TDICI decided to
open its operations in Bangalore. The reason for this was that by 1988, when TDICI was
prepared to begin serious investing, interest in technology had increased due to the success of
multinationals )such as Texas Instruments and Hewlett Packard) that were operating in
Bangalore. Also, the TDICI managers wanted to escape from ICICI’s large-firm culture.
TDICI  had  to  decide  between  Pune  and  Bangalore,  both  of  which  were  emerging  as
technology centers. Bangalore was chosen because the Indian software firms such as Wipro,
PSI  Data,  and  Infosys  were  based  in  Bangalore  (Nadkarni  2000).  Bangalore  was  the
beneficiary of the decision by the Indian government to establish it as the national center for
high technology. The research activities of state-owned firms such as Indian Telephone
Industries, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO),
and the Defence Research Development Organization, along with the Indian Institute of
Science (India’s best research university), were centralized there.
TDICI’s Vecaus I assumed ICICI’s venture capital investments, then valued at 25 million
rupees, and invested in several successful information technology firms in Bangalore. Its first
president, P. Sudarshan, was an eighteen-year veteran of the Indian Scientific Research
Organization and had headed their technology transfer division. Nadkarni was the head of
the  venture  capital  division  and  became  the  TDICI  president  in  March  1990.  Several
established software firms received funds from TDICI, including Wipro for developing a
“ruggedized” computer for army use. There were several successes, including several firms
which went public, such as VXL, Mastek Software Systems, Microland, and Sun Pharmaceu-
ticals. From its inception through 1994, the fund had an inflation-adjusted internal rate of24
return of 28 percent (before the compensation of the venture capitalists). This was despite
several mistakes, such as initially funding several import-substitution products that were
negatively impacted by a lowering of import tariffs.9 Also, initially TDICI saw itself as an
organization funding technology ventures, and did not focus as directly upon commercial
objectives, thus it made investments in interesting technology and not, perhaps, the best
business opportunities (Pandey 1998: 258). There also were organizational failures, the most
important of which was allowing relatively junior recruits to filter the deals before the senior
professionals saw them. As a result, several high-quality potential investments were missed.
Third, Vecaus I made forty investments to be managed by seven professionals. In retrospect,
Nadkarni (2000) believed that was too large a number. By 1994, the difficulties created by
the institutional ownership in the management and funding of TDICI began to tell on staff
morale, and the performance of the fund’s new investments was relatively poor.
Despite its difficulties, TDICI was the most successful of the early government-related
venture capital operations. Moreover, TDICI personnel played an important role in the
formalization of the Indian venture capital industry. Kiran Nadkarni established the Indian
Venture Capital Association, and was the Indian partner for the first U.S. firm, Draper
International to begin operations in India. In addition to Nadkarni, TDICI personnel also
left  to  join  yet  other  firms.  For  example,  Vijay  Angadi  joined  ICF  Ventures,  a  fund
subscribed to by overseas investors (ICF Ventures 2000). Also, a number of TDICI alumni
became managers in Indian technology firms. So, the legacy of TDICI includes not only
evidence that venture capital could be successful in India, despite all of the constraints, but
also a cadre of experienced personnel that would move into the private sector.
There were other early funds. For example, in 1990, Gujarat Venture Finance Limited
(GVFL) began operations with a 240 million rupee fund with investments from the World
Bank,  the  U.K.  Commonwealth  Development  Fund,  the  Gujarat  Industrial  Investment
Corporation, Industrial Development Bank of India, various banks, state corporations, and
private firms (GVFL 2000). GVFL was established with a handicap, namely that it was
meant to invest in the state of Gujarat. However, though its returns were not high, it was
sufficiently successful so that in 1995, it was able to raise 600 million rupees for a second
fund that the Small Industrial Development Bank of India also joined. Then in 1997 it raised
a third fund to target the information technology sector.
GVFL’s investment targets shifted through time. As the table below on Gujarat Venture
Finance Limited Investments indicates, from the 1990 fund to the 1995 fund there were
fewer food and agriculture-related firms and a greater emphasis on information technology.
The 1997 fund only invested in information technology, discovering what U.S. venture
capitalists had learned fifty years earlier, namely that only fast-changing industries in which
large returns are possible can justify venture investing (Kenney 2001). As with other firms,
GVFL was restricted in the financial instruments it could use and, as a state institution, they
were under pressure to invest in the state of Gujarat. Even more than TDICI, GVFL lacked
professional expertise. In 1998, the president of GVFL estimated that ultimately he would be
able to achieve a 15 percent annualized return (Radhakrishnan 1998)—a relatively weak
return.25
The other two venture funds also had marginal performances. The Andhra Pradesh state
government formed a venture fund subsidiary in its AP Industrial Development Corporation
(APDIC). As in the case of GVFL, it was mandated to invest in its state. Though located in a
relatively strong high-technology region around Hyderabad, APDIC suffered from all the
difficulties of state-operated venture capital funds and has also had a relatively low return.
The final venture fund was the only bank-operated venture capital fund, which was a
subsidiary of nationalized Canara Bank, CanBank Venture Capital Fund (Canbank). Canbank,
which was headquartered in Bangalore, also performed poorly. Despite their rather weak
performance, all of these firms raised new funds and were able to continue their operations.
This first stage of the venture capital industry in India was plagued by inexperienced
management,  mandates  to  invest  in  certain  states  and  sectors,  and  general  regulatory
problems. The firms’ overall performance was poor, and only TDICI could be considered a
success. As mentioned earlier, such problems with government-sponsored venture capital are
not unique. Venture capital investing is a difficult art. Government interference and limita-
tions almost invariably increase the risks in an already risky enterprise, making failure more
likely.  And  yet,  from  this  disappointing  first  stage,  there  came  a  realization  that  there
actually were viable investment opportunities in India, and a number of venture capitalists
had received training.
Gujarat Venture Finance Limited Investments in 1990 and 1995 Funds
Firm Name 1990 Industrial Field 1990 Firm Name 1995 Industrial Field 1995
Premionics India Filtration membranes Computerskill Specialized printing
Saraf Foods Dried fruits Srinisons Cables Auto wiring
Systech Flight data acquisition
systems
Lokesh Machines Machine tools
Ajay Bio-tech Bio-fertilizers Mark Walker
Opticals
Designer optical
frames
Colortek Liquid colorants
for plastics
Apex Electricals High rating
transformers
Agrochem Tocopherol from fatty
acid
Akshay Software
Technologies
Turnkey software
Lactochem Lactic acid from
molasses
Minda Instruments Auto panel instrument
clusters
Cals Wide area networking Indus Boffa Brakes Disk brake pads
TIPCO Thermoplastic Nexstor India Hardware system
manageability product
Madhusudan
Ceramics
Glazed tiles using new
firing process
20 Microns Micronized minerals
Radiant Software IT training & software
Source: GVFL 2000.2627
6.2 The Second Stage, 1995–1999
The success of Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley that began in the 1980s became far
more visible in the 1990s. This attracted attention and encouraged the notion in the United
States that India might have more possible entrepreneurs. The figure on total capital under
management  indicates  how  quickly  the  amount  of  capital  under  management  in  India
increased  after  1995.10 The greatest source of this increase was the entrance of foreign
institutional investors (see the ensuing figure on Indian Venture Capital Funds by Year and
Source in percent). This included investment arms of foreign banks, but particularly impor-
tant were venture capital funds raised abroad. Very often, NRIs were important investors in
these funds. In quantitative terms, it is possible to see a dramatic change in the role of foreign
investors. Notice also the comparative decrease in the role of the multilateral development
agencies and the Indian government’s financial institutions. The overseas private sector
investors became a dominant force in the Indian venture capital industry.
In the United States, the venture capital industry is clustered in three specific regions (in
order of descending importance): Silicon Valley (San Francisco Bay Area), New York, and
Boston. It is significant to note that Silicon Valley and Boston are what can be termed
“technology-related” venture capital clusters, while New York is a “finance-related” cluster
(Florida and Kenney 1998a, 1988b). In India, as the figure on location (below) indicates,
there is also a clustering under way. As late as 1998, Bombay, Bangalore, and New Delhi
were comparable in terms of number of offices. However, by 2000, Bombay, the country’s
commercial capital, and New Delhi, the government capital, dramatically increased their
share of the venture capital offices. This is in contrast to the United States, where Silicon
Valley asserted its dominance as a technology center at the end of the 1970s and became the
center of venture capital as well.
Location of the Headquarters of the Members of Indian Venture Capital
Association 1993–1998 and 2000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000
B o m b a y 4324563 1
N e w   D e l h i 3332341 0
Hyderabad 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B a n g a l o r e 2225558
Ahmedabad 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C a l c u t t a 1111112
Pu n e 0011112
C h e n n a i 0001111
L u c k n o w 0001110
T o t a l 1 11 11 11 71 92 15 6
* Where there was more than one office, only the headquarters was counted.
Source: Indian Venture Capital Association Various Years; Nasscom 2000.28
This absence of venture capital firms from Bangalore is overstated, though, because the
largest venture capital firms in capital terms, i.e., TDICI, Draper, Walden-Nikko, JumpStartup
and e4e, are headquartered in Bangalore. In fact, Walden-Nikko closed its Bombay offices in
2000  to  consolidate  in  Bangalore.  Two  other  important  private  venture  capital  firms,
Chrysalis (Bombay) and Infinity (Delhi), have operations in Bangalore as well. In some cases,
there were distinct reasons for locating in Bombay. For example, Chrysalis, which set up
operations in 1999, chose Bombay because of the Internet boom, which was centered in
Bombay (Dhawan, 1999). As in the case of New York’s Silicon Alley, this may have proved
to be a strategic error, given the dot-com collapse in India in 2001. In the case of Infinity, it
chose Delhi because the partners lived there. Another large venture capital firm, SIDBI, is
based in Bombay because it is a subsidiary of a state-owned bank with corporate headquar-
ters in Lucknow and Bombay. Also, Citibank’s venture capital operation is headquartered in
Bombay; but its portfolio consists mainly of private equity “salvage-type” deals and some
Internet startups. Many of the other Bombay venture capital operations are involved in
what, in the United States, would be considered financial engineering. Thus Bombay has a
venture capital community that resembles the New York financial cluster.
The involvement of the overseas private sector in the Indian venture capital industry was
an  experimental  process.  For  example,  in  1993,  in  an  attempt  to  develop  investment
opportunities businesses in India, Vinod Khosla (2000) spent three years commuting be-
tween India and Silicon Valley. In 1996, he gave up, returning full-time to Silicon Valley, as
he concluded that the Indian environment for venture capital development was inadequate.
Khosla was not alone. In 1993, Bill Draper, who had begun venture investing in 1959,
returned to Silicon Valley from a series of positions dealing with development in the federal
government and then the United Nations. In conjunction with a Stanford second-year MBA
student, Robin Richards, Draper decided to begin venture investing in a developing country.
After reviewing a number of countries, he decided that India’s strength in software and
English capabilities made it an ideal candidate. So, in 1995, he formed Draper International
and recruited investments from a number of successful Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and
investors of Indian descent (Draper 2000). This would the first major overseas firm to begin
investing in India. To head their Indian office, they attracted Kiran Nadkarni from TDICI.
Though Draper International would be the first, others soon followed. In late 1996, the
Walden Group’s Walden International Investment Group (WIIG) initiated its India-focused
venture capital operation. The first fund, Walden-Nikko India Venture Co., was a joint
venture  between  WIIG  and  Nikko  Capital  of  Japan,  investing  in  early  and  late-stage
companies (wiig.com 2000). In the late 1990s, many more venture capital funds established
operations in India.
The formalization of the Indian venture capital community began in 1993 with the
formation of the Indian Venture Capital Association (IVCA) headquartered in Bangalore.
The prime mover for this was TDICI’s Nadkarni, who became its first president. There were
nine  members,  the  state-owned  or  managed  ones  being  TDICI,  GVFL,  the  Industrial
Development  Bank  of  India’s  venture  capital  division,  RCTC,  APIDC’s  venture  capital
division, and Canbank ventures. The private members were Credit Capital Corporation, a
joint venture with Commonwealth Development Corporation, headed by investment banker
Udayan Bose, headquartered in Mumbai, Indus Ventures of Mumbai (started by T. Thomas,
an ex-Unilever board member, and the Mahindra Group), Grindlays (later part of the ANZ
banking  group,  subsequently  purchased  by  Standard  Chartered  Bank),  and  the  British
venture firm 3i Corporation. Initially, the IVCA met only quarterly due to their geographical29
dispersion. Also, since the majority of the firms were subsidiaries of the Indian government
agencies or banks and received funds from international development agencies, there was
little real need to interact intensively.
IVCA had little success in addressing the main problem of most of its members, that of
the absence of tax pass-through (see Section 6.1). The regulatory structure gave venture
capital some tax benefits, notably that a tax rate lower than the corporate tax rate and equal
to the individual tax rate, would be levied on their capital gains. This was still unacceptable
to  venture  capital  firms,  which  wanted  that  their  firms’  capital  gains  pass-through  to
investors without tax, in common with international practice. The reasons for lack of success
on tax pass-through were twofold. First, the government did not understand the benefits of
venture capital in economic development terms, viewing these as more akin to banks (which
were taxable). This was a result, in large measure, of the lack of recognition of the potential
of the Indian-owned portion of the software industry. Moreover, the venture capital industry
was tiny with respect to the overall Indian economy, having committed funds of 3 billion
rupees and disbursements of less than half that amount. Hence, they were unable to mobilize
sufficient political pressure to motivate any liberalization. Second, the largest player, TDICI,
had few reasons to demand changes in the regulations, because it was unaffected by them
due to UTI’s tax-exempt status (and, perhaps, benefited by being able to attract funding
away from its taxed brethren).
As late as 1999, the IVCA was still struggling to be an effective lobbying force. In fact,
much of the most powerful lobbying for the Indian venture capital industry comes from the
Indian information technology industry association NASSCOM. The IVCA does not even
have a website. The most authoritative Web-based information on the Indian venture capital
industry is available from the NASSCOM site.
There are internal divisions also. According to one source, in 1999 approximately 80
percent of the total venture capital investments were derived from overseas firms (Singhvi
1999).  These  foreign  firms  registered  in  Mauritius  as  a  strategy  to  avoid  the  onerous
regulations and taxes imposed by the Indian government—a mechanism that foreign securi-
ties firms seeking to invest in India had pioneered.11 A Mauritius registry allowed tax pass-
through, and since they did not have other issues, such as finding funds, they had little
incentive to join IVCA or actively lobby the Indian government. IVCA thus was a vehicle for
Indian venture capital funds seeking to obtain a level playing field with the foreign funds. In
fact, in the past, differences within IVCA surfaced, with the overseas funds arguing for more
regulation from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board, which has a liberal record, and
less from the Ministry of Finance, which has a contradictory record. The domestic funds
favored a single regulator, and they ultimately won this debate when the SEBI was formed.
Still, the divisions in the IVCA prevented it from becoming an important player in the
regulatory debates during the late 1990s.
Only in 1996 did overseas and truly private domestic venture capitalists begin investing.
This increase in investment was accelerated by SEBI’s announcement of the first guidelines
for  registration  and  investment  by  venture  capital  firms.  Though  these  changes  had  a
salutary effect, the development of venture capital continued to be inhibited because overall
the regulatory regime remained cumbersome. The inhibition is partly expressed in the fact
that as of December 1999 nearly 50 percent of the offshore pool of funds had not yet been
invested (IFC 1999).
The IVCA also has difficulties; as of December 1998, only 21 venture capital firms were
registered with IVCA. Of these firms, eight are in the public sector and seven have received30
funds from multilateral funding agencies (IVCA 1998). Despite these difficulties, an increas-
ing number of Indian firms were able to list on the NASDAQ and on the Indian stock market. If
the Indian venture capital industry continues to expand and a regulatory framework that ends
the benefit for offshore registration is enacted, then the IVCA will be able to present unified
positions. This will enable it to become the voice of the Indian venture capital sector.
7. Recent Government Efforts to Encourage Venture Investing
In the late 1990s, the Indian government became aware of the potential benefits of a healthy
venture capital sector. Thus in 1999 a number of new regulations were promulgated. Some
of the most significant of these related to liberalizing the regulations regarding the ability of
various financial institutions to invest in venture capital. Perhaps the most important of these
went into effect in April 1999 and allowed banks to invest up to 5 percent of their new funds
annually in venture capital. However, as of 2001 they have not made any venture capital
investments.  This  is  not  surprising  since  bank  managers  are  rewarded  for  risk-averse
behavior. Lending to a risky, fast-growing firm could be unwise because the loan principal is
at risk while the reward is only interest.12 In such an environment, even if bankers were good
at evaluating fledgling firms, itself a dubious proposition, extending loans would be unwise.
This  meant  that  since  banks  control  the  bulk  of  discretionary  financial  savings  in  the
country, there is little internally generated capital available for venture investing.
The bureaucratic obstacles to the free operation of venture capital remained significant.
There  continued  to  be  a  confusing  array  of  newly  created  statutes.  The  main  statutes
governing venture capital in India included the SEBI’s 1996 Venture Capital Regulations, the
1995 Guidelines for Overseas Venture Capital Investments issued by the Department of
Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Board of Direct Taxes’ (CBDT)
1995 Guidelines for Venture Capital Companies (later modified in 1999). In early 2000,
domestic venture capitalists were regulated by three government bodies: the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Ministry of Finance, and the CBDT. For foreign venture
capital  firms  there  was  even  greater  regulation  in  the  form  of  the  Foreign  Investment
Promotion Board (FIPB), which approves every investment, and the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI), which approves every disinvestment.
The stated aim of the Indian regulatory regime is to be neutral with regard to the risk
profile of investment recipients, but concerns about misuse have not allowed for complete
neutrality. Only six industries have been approved for investment: software, information
technology, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, agriculture, and industries allied to the first
five. Statutory guidelines also limited investments in individual firms based on the firm’s and
the fund’s capital.
These regulations regarding venture capital were cumbersome and sometimes contradic-
tory. Income tax rules provided that venture capital funds may invest only up to 40 percent
of the paid-up capital of a recipient firm, and also not beyond 25 percent of their own funds.
The Government of India guidelines also prescribed similar restrictions. Finally, the SEBI
regulations did not have any sectoral investment restrictions except to prohibit investment in
financial services firms. The result of these various restrictions was a micromanagement of
investment, complicating the activities of the venture capital firms without either increasing
effectiveness or reducing risk to any appreciable extent.31
Impediments to the development of venture capital also can be traced to India’s corpo-
rate, tax, and currency laws. India’s corporate law did not provide for limited partnerships,
limited liability partnerships, or limited liability corporations (LP, LLP, and LLC, respec-
tively). Moreover, corporate law allowed equity investors to receive payment only in the
form of dividends (i.e., no in-kind or capital distributions are allowed). Disclosure require-
ments were, however, consistent with best international practice. However, in the absence of
seasoned institutional investors, advanced-country standards of investor protection that
would normally be imposed by such investors have not developed. There was not even a self-
regulatory group.
These regulations did not create an inviting environment for investors. For example, all
investors in the venture capital fund had limited liability, and there was no flexibility in risk-
sharing arrangements. There were no standard control arrangements, so they had to be
determined by negotiation between management and investors in the fund. Also, Indian
regulations did not recognize limited life funds, so in India it was relatively easy to terminate
a trust, but this meant that the entire firm was closed rather than a specific fund within the
firm. Therefore, each fund had to be created as a separate trust or company. This process is
administratively and legally time-consuming. Terminating a fund is even more cumbersome,
as it requires court approval on a case-by-case basis.
India’s regulatory framework earlier inhibited practices used in the United States to
reward employees of startup firms. From 1998, however, founders and employees can
participate in employee stock option programs. India’s corporate laws allow for flexible risk
sharing, control and exit arrangements between financiers and firm management, provided
the firms in which they invest are private. These are defined as firms having less than 50
outside shareholders (who are not employees). However, for firms with more than 50 non-
employee shareholders, India’s corporate law does not provide flexibility in using equity to
reward employees. While this may be satisfactory for early-stage venture capital investors, it
could discourage later-stage investors who invest as parts of a consortium.
The restrictions on venture capital extend beyond the framework of corporate law. For
instance, tax restrictions on corporations require that corporations paying dividends must
pay a 10 percent dividend–distribution tax on the aggregate dividend.13 On the other hand,
trusts granting dividends are exempt from dividend tax. An optimal environment for venture
capital requires a tax regime that is fiscally neutral from the viewpoint of tax revenue. The
environment should also be tax-competitive with other domestic uses of institutional and
private equity finance, particularly the domestic mutual funds sector. However, the tax code
in  2001  was  disadvantageous  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  international  venture  capital
investor. Earnings from an international venture capital investor are taxed even if it is a tax-
exempt institution in its country of origin.14
Another significant impediment to developing a vibrant venture capital industry was
India’s foreign currency regulations. Even in 2001, the Indian rupee was nonconvertible. The
lack of convertibility hampered venture capital inflows from offshore because specific, time-
consuming governmental approvals from multiple agencies were required for each invest-
ment and disinvestment.
Just as the currency regime inhibited international venture capital firms from investing in
India,  domestic  venture  capital  firms  were  not  allowed  to  invest  offshore.  Synergistic
investments in overseas firms that collaborate with domestic firms were next to impossible.
The currency regime also frustrated exit strategies. For example, in early 1999, Armedia, an
Indian manufacturer of high-technology telecommunications equipment, was in discussion32
with Broadcom, a U.S. firm, about being acquired, and it also was seeking an investment
from an Indian venture capitalist. However, since Indian venture capital firms cannot own
offshore shares, the deal with Broadcom would have had to be changed from a “pooling-of-
interests” transaction to a cash acquisition. Broadcom, therefore, offered a significantly
smaller sum to Armedia, because of the Indian venture capital firm’s involvement. Fortu-
nately for Armedia, it was able to obtain bridge funding offshore and did not have to use an
Indian venture capital firm (Dave 1999). The Indian legal and regulatory environment
continued to inhibit venture capital investors from maximizing their returns.
8. Policy Recommendations
An  Indian  venture  capital  industry  is  emerging,  but  it  may  not  thrive  in  the  current
investment environment. As we have seen, many of the preconditions do exist, but the
obstacles are many. Some of these can be addressed directly without affecting other aspects
of the Indian political economy. Others are more deeply rooted in the economy and will be
much more difficult to overcome without having a significant impact on other parts of the
economy. A number of these issues were addressed in a report submitted to SEBI in January
2000 from its Committee on Venture Capital. SEBI then recommended that the Ministry of
Finance adopt many of its suggestions.
In June 2000, the Ministry of Finance adopted a number of the Committee’s proposals.
For example, it accepted that only SEBI should regulate and register venture capital firms.
The  only  criterion  was  to  be  the  technical  qualifications  of  their  promoters,  whether
domestic or offshore. Such registration would not impose any capital requirements or legal
structure—this is very important, because it would allow India to develop a legal structure
suitable to its environment. However, the proposed guidelines continued to prohibit finance
and real estate investments. Whether this type of micromanagement is good policy seems
dubious. No other governments require such exclusions. Also, registered venture capital
funds must invest 70 percent of their paid-in capital in unlisted equity or equity-related, fully
convertible instruments.15 Similarly, related-company transactions would be prohibited, and
not more than 25 percent of a fund’s capital could be invested in a single firm. In the United
States most of these provisions are not law, but are codified in the limited partnership
contracts and accepted as common sense. Rather than letting the market decide which
venture capital firms are operating responsibly, the Indian government continues to specify a
variety of conditions.
A number of suggestions were not accepted even though they would assist in the growth
of  venture  capital.  Many  were  related  to  the  much  larger  general  issues  of  corporate
governance. For example, there was no change in the regulations regarding restrictions on
currency nonconvertibility, providing employees more flexible stock-option plans, allowing
domestic venture capital firms to hold equity in overseas startups, and regulations allowing
greater flexibility in voting and dividend rights. Reluctance to adopt these measures is
understandable, because they would strike at some of the fundamental issues of corporate
governance in India. Thus they were seen as policy decisions that might set in motion an
unacceptably larger chain of events; conversely, it looks as if they will happen only as a
consequence of a larger chain of events.33
In 2001, the venture capital environment remains in flux. For example, there are issues
regarding how capital gains and losses by venture capital funds should be treated. Venture
capital funds are not allowed to pass-through income earned or losses to investors without
being taxed. In most countries, it is the investors in the fund that pay the taxes. Also, stock
and other capital distributions are forbidden. At present, in India this is only possible for
trusts. The lack of appropriate legal structures such as the limited partnership, limited
liability partnership, and the limited liability corporation continues. Creation of a new legal
entity would further encourage venture capital investing.
There are also obstacles for overseas venture capitalists—a seemingly unwise set of
barriers to a country wishing to attract much-needed foreign capital and to create incentives
for  the  continuing  growth  of  the  venture  capital  industry.  Currently,  foreign  venture
capitalists require permission from the RBI/FIPB for each investment and liquidation. The
RBI’s formula for disinvestment is based on physical asset value and benchmark price–
earnings ratios, both of which are often irrelevant. For example, a firm that has primarily
intellectual property and makes a loss may still be valuable, but Indian rules do not allow it
to be valued properly. Finally, foreign and domestic firms cannot repatriate capital or
earnings without further regulatory involvement. There are restrictions on the ability of
Indian firms to trade their stock for that of an overseas firm, and it is extremely difficult to
sell an Indian firm to a foreign firm—something that is simple and common for venture
capital-funded firms in Israel, Sweden, Canada, or the United Kingdom. Conversely, Indian
venture capital funds today find it difficult to invest abroad, a significant handicap when it is
considered that venture capital funds in nearly all other countries are not only allowed to
invest abroad, but also do so to secure access to more deals. The ability of Israeli venture
capital funds to invest abroad, especially in firms established by expatriate Israelis, has been
crucial to the dramatic growth of the Israeli venture capital industry. In effect, the lack of
convertibility of the Indian rupee is a structural impediment.
Although published data on venture capital investment after the moderate liberalizations
effected in 2000 are not yet available, there are indications that investment has increased.
This indicates that further liberalization could elicit even greater venture capital activity.
Unofficial figures gathered by SEBI and IVCA16 show that over $1 billion was invested in
2000, although the flow has substantially declined in the first two months of 2001 due to the
global tightening of venture capital investment. Interestingly, because the overseas investors
are not regulated by SEBI, it is difficult to be certain about the amount of investment. Foreign
funds, in the absence of sensible regulations for overseas funds (as discussed above), have
preferred  the  more  bureaucratic  but  ultimately  workable  process  offered  by  the  FIPB.
However, since the FIPB does not classify approvals by investment stage, any statistics are
necessarily approximations.
9. Conclusion
Earlier patterns of growth or failure in venture capital industries in other countries and
regions indicate that the evolution of venture capital seems to be either entry into a self-
reinforcing spiral, such as occurred in Silicon Valley and Israel, or growth and stagnation, as
occurred in Minnesota in the 1980s (Kenney and von Burg, 2000) or the United Kingdom
until recently. Given India’s wish to develop a high-technology industry funded by venture34
capital, it is necessary to keep improving the environment by simplifying the policy and
regulatory structure (including eliminating regulations that do not perform necessary func-
tions such as consumer protection).
Today, a venture capital industry is emerging in India as a result of internal and external
factors. Should the venture capital industry be sufficiently successful to become self-sustain-
ing, the Indian NIS will be altered. This would be interesting because most scholars have
treated the NIS as a relatively fixed system. However, during the 1990s the dominance of
government institutions and family-owned conglomerates in the Indian innovation system
began to shift somewhat so that entrepreneurship began to play a larger role. Moreover,
scholars have generally treated India as a largely self-contained NIS, but during the 1990s
the NRIs became an increasingly important component of the NIS through their wealth,
contacts, and political and economic influence.
The World Bank, with its agenda of decreasing government regulation, funded the
creation of the first venture capital funds. Though these funds experienced little success, they
were the beginnings of a process of legitimitizing venture investing and they were a training
ground for venture capitalists who later established private venture capital funds. It is
unlikely that the venture capital industry could have been successful without the develop-
ment of the software industry and a general liberalization of the economy. Of course, this is
not entirely surprising, because an institution as complicated as venture capital could not
emerge without a minimally supportive environment. This environment both permitted the
evolution of the venture capital industry and simultaneously allowed it to begin changing
that environment and initiating a co-evolutionary dynamic with other institutions.
India still remains a difficult environment for venture capital. Even in 2001 the Indian
government remains bureaucratic and highly regulated. To encourage the growth of venture
capital will require further action, and it is likely that the government will continue and even
accelerate its efforts to encourage venture capital investing. The role of the government
cannot be avoided: it must address tax, regulatory, legal, and currency exchange policies,
since many of these affect both venture capital firms and the companies that they finance.
More mechanisms need to be developed to reduce risk if funds for venture capital must come
from publicly held financial institutions managed by highly risk-averse managers.
India is an example of how purposive action in an environment replete with resources
can have long-term impacts on the NIS. The ultimate fate of the Indian venture capital
industry is not, as of February 2001, decided. Even as it grew rapidly during the global
Internet-fed venture capital boom of 1998 through early 2000, its continued growth is in no
way guaranteed. If the earlier period provided the resources for constituting new firms, then
the period that began after February 2000 will be a stringent filter that will remove less
viable competitors, in terms of venture capital-backed investments and many of the venture
capital funds. Both the venture capital firms and the industry as a whole will be tested
severely.35
Notes
1 On path dependency, see Arthur (1994) and David (1985). For NIS, see Nelson (1993) and
Lundvall (1992).
2 For a more general conceptualization, see Kogut (2000).
3 There are, of course, many important venture capital firms headquartered in other regions,
and there is a diversity of venture capital specialists. For example, there are funds that
specialize in retail ventures. Some of the largest venture capital funds, such as Oak Invest-
ment Partners and New Enterprise Associates, have partners devoted to retail ventures,
though their main focus is IT. So, there is significant diversity in the venture capital industry
(Gupta and Sapienza 1992).
4 In 2001 the limit of SBA support was increased to $109 million.
5 According to a 1991 RBI report, the gross profit (before provisions on bank assets and
taxes) had come down to 1 percent of assets (a healthy norm would be about 1 percent for
profits after provisions and taxes). Moreover, approximately 25 percent of the total loans
were bad.
6 For a discussion of the perverse of effects of this system, see Lim (1998).
7 Here we use the term “relatively skilled,” because Indian postgraduate training was not as
good as the training in the best U.S. graduate schools. Put differently, the Indians who were
trained in the elite U.S. schools may have been closer to the cutting edge of engineering.
8 Though we could find no direct evidence of interaction, it is likely that the World Bank
personnel were very much aware of the structure of the SBA and its initial problems.
9 Here they ignored the World Bank’s suggestion that they avoid protected industries.
10 The last available information from IVCA is 1998. The 1999 figures have not yet been
released.
11 One of the authors of this paper, Rafiq Dossani, helped pioneer this mechanism when he
was an investment banker.
12 It is true that in the United States, banks have never been an important source of venture
capital, even through their SBIC subsidiaries. For the most part, a bank’s core competencies
are in evaluating and making loans. The problem with loans to small startups is that the
capital is at high risk, so any interest rate would have to be usurious. Moreover, since the
new firm is often losing money in its early days, paying interest and principal would drain
money from the firm during the period when it most requires the money for investment.36
13 The tax was to be raised to 20 percent in the tax proposals for the financial year beginning
April 2000.
14 There is a loophole available to foreign investors, which is to register its fund in a country
having a special tax treaty with India providing effective tax exemption, such as Mauritius or
the Dutch Antilles.
15 The 70 percent rule would prevent financial firms that are investing primarily in listed
firms, in which the risk-profile of investments could be substantially different from startups,
from qualifying for tax pass-through.
16 From private conversations in February 2001 with SEBI’s Executive Director L.K. Singhvi
and IVCA President Saurabh Srivastava.37
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